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Moving to Opportunity: The Political Effects of a Housing Mobility Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:   
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development launched the Moving to 
Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration Program (MTO), a lottery that offered poor 
families vouchers to move out of public housing into private apartments. Drawing on recently 
collected vote history data, this study reveals that MTO has had the unintended consequence of 
reducing voter turnout among participating adults. The low turnout may be due to the loss of 
social ties that accompanied mobility. The findings suggest that residential mobility, a popular 
tool in the fight against poverty, may strain poor Americans’ weak ties to the political system. 
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More than a quarter of the metropolitan poor, nearly seven million people, live in 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty, defined as census tracts with poverty rates of 
30 percent or more (Kingsley and Pettit 2003). Researchers have long noted that the “spatial 
concentration of poor people acts to magnify poverty and exacerbate it effects,” by isolating the 
poor from the job opportunities, better schools, private investment and social supports essential 
to struggling families (Jargowsky 1997, 1).  In 1994, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), in an effort to reduce concentrations of poverty and move poor families to 
self-sufficiency, recruited over 4000 families, from five different cities, to participate in an 
ambitious social experiment: a lottery that offered participants the opportunity to move out of 
public housing in high-poverty neighborhoods into private apartments in low-poverty 
communities.  For the policy designers, the goal of the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing 
Demonstration Program (MTO) was to improve the labor market outcomes, educational 
achievement and health of low-income adults and their children, using the tool of residential 
mobility.  But residential mobility also has the potential to disrupt and, perhaps, transform—for 
better or for worse—the political lives of poor Americans.  By imposing new administrative 
burdens (e.g. the need to change voter registration), while at the same time exposing participants 
to new social environments and networks, the MTO experimental intervention, unintentionally, 
manipulated both the costs and incentives to electoral participation, with unknown consequences 
for the behavior of the targeted adults.  This article examines the unintended political 
consequences of the move to opportunity, and considers whether residential mobility, an 
increasingly popular tool for combating poverty, is likely to strengthen or to further strain poor 
Americans weak ties to the political system.   
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Drawing on vote history data for the adult participants in the MTO demonstration, I 
measure the effect of the mobility lottery on subsequent rates of voter registration and voter 
turnout. The analysis reveals that, on balance, the MTO intervention has had detrimental effects 
on political participation. Participants who “won” the lottery—that is, adults whose families were 
randomly allocated a housing voucher for use in moving to a low-poverty neighborhood—were 
less likely to vote in a subsequent national election.  In the domain of politics, the costs of 
residential mobility may outweigh the benefits that come from access to the resources, role 
models, and recruiting agents available in more advantaged neighborhoods. The results have 
implications for policymakers concerned with poverty, as well as for scholars interested in the 
determinants of political participation.  
 
The Perils of Concentration and the Promise of Mobility 
There is a large and growing empirical literature documenting the considerable 
challenges faced by the residents of high-poverty neighborhoods. Ethnographic accounts, as well 
as large-scale statistical analyses, confirm that poor families in areas of concentrated poverty fare 
substantially worse on a wide range of outcomes (e.g. chronic joblessness, adolescent 
delinquency, criminal behavior, depression, obesity) than do similarly poor families with more 
affluent neighbors (Wilson 1987; Jencks and Mayer 1990; Ellen and Turner 1997; see Sampson, 
Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley 2002 for review of this literature).  A critical mass of 
economically stable residents provides a community with an essential buffer against physical 
decay and social disorder, while also helping to maintain the institutions and networks vital to 
economic and social well-being.    
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Emerging alongside, and in response to, the research on concentration effects have been a 
number of studies that examine what happens when policy interventions offer residents a way 
out of their high-poverty neighborhoods. Beginning with the Gautreaux program in Chicago, and 
continuing with studies of HOPE VI and MTO, economists, sociologists, and public health 
experts have used longitudinal data on program participants to measure the benefits of mobility, 
and to determine whether living among more affluent neighbors generates positive externalities 
for the poor (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000; Keels et al. 2005; Mendenhall, DeLuca and 
Duncan 2006;  Popkin et al. 2004;  Popkin 2007;  Orr et al. 2003; Kling, Liebman, Katz 2007; 
Kling, Ludwig, Katz 2005; Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2003; Ludwig, Duncan, Hirschfield 
2001; Katz, Kling, Liebman 2001; Popkin, Leventhal and Weismann 2008).  The findings have 
been mixed. Mobility programs have been linked to improvements in quality of life, perceptions 
of safety, and mental and physical health. For children, moving to low-poverty areas has 
contributed to gains in educational achievement and success, and declines in the incidence of 
delinquent and risky behavior, especially for girls. But, with the exception of Gautreaux, the 
interventions have had no effect on employment, earnings or self-sufficiency. Furthermore, 
emotional and behavioral outcomes for boys rarely improved and in some cases worsened 
following relocation.  As for the political consequences of these mobility programs, the extant 
research is silent.  
Yet political scientists have hardly been silent on the subjects of poverty, mobility and 
political participation.  Political engagement is sharply stratified by class, with the poor 
considerably less active than the rich (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995).  This pattern reflects, in part, the role of individual resources such as education and 
income in facilitating political activity.  While attention to individual poverty has dominated the  
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research, with a consensus that the poor participate less because they have fewer resources to 
spare, scholars have hypothesized that the physical environments in which many poor people 
live—namely, neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty—also shape their political 
behavior, and may be contributing to the low participation typical of this group.  In fact, studies 
show that low-income residents of high-poverty neighborhoods are less likely to vote in local 
and national elections (Alex-Assensoh 1998, 2001), and to make political donations and attend 
community meetings (Cohen and Dawson 1993) than similarly poor residents of more affluent 
areas. These relationships are most pronounced among poor blacks, but are not limited to them. 
Alex-Assensoh (1998, 2001) finds that even non-poor residents, black and white, of high-poverty 
neighborhoods suffer some degree of “political isolation,” either manifested in lower rates of 
voter registration and turnout, or in the infrequency of acts such as signing petitions.  
Whether “extreme neighborhood poverty acts to weaken the attachment of residents to 
the participatory process of ‘democratic’ life,” as Cohen and Dawson (1993, 297; emphasis 
added) conclude, cannot be resolved on the basis of observational studies alone. The validity of 
an empirical strategy that relies exclusively on naturally occurring correlations between 
individual political behavior and contextual characteristics is undermined by the fact that 
individuals self-select into neighborhoods, sorting themselves across communities for reasons 
that may be related to the determinants of political behavior.  The poor residents of low-poverty 
neighborhoods may be different, in unobservable but politically relevant ways, from the poor 
residents of high-poverty neighborhoods.
1 Without taking these background traits into account, it 
is not possible to distinguish true (neighborhood-level) “concentration effects” from the effects 
of the (individual-level) attributes of people who live in different types of areas.   
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Although observational studies documenting the distinctive patterns of political behavior 
in areas with high concentrations of poor people are not well-suited to casual inference, the 
extant research is nonetheless significant for the theoretical insights it offers about the potential 
mechanisms of concentration effects and, by extension, the possible political implications of a 
policy intervention like the MTO.  The neighborhood environment can be a source of politically-
relevant resources, in the form of institutions and organizations serving community residents.  In 
addition to their official mandates, locally-based institutions—libraries, churches, family support 
centers, social and cultural clubs, block groups—provide associational spaces where political 
information may be disseminated, and where residents can be contacted and recruited into 
political activity (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  As physical structures, local institutions can 
provide for safe and accessible polling places, as well as sites for political candidates to visit. 
And for active members, participation in local groups and organizations facilitates the 
development of civic skills that may be transferable to the political arena (Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995). Neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty, when compared to more 
affluent communities, may lack the institutional resources that facilitate political activity, leading 
to lower participation among residents.
2 
Concentration effects may also emerge from the distinctive characteristics of social 
networks in high-poverty areas, and the importance of social interactions for political activity.  
Rarely does political activity occur in individual isolation; most political acts are “socially 
learned and stimulated” (Huckfeldt 1979, 581; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1995; Lake and 
Huckfeldt 1998; Giles and Dantico 1982; Fowler 2005; Kenney 1992; Knack 1992; Knack and 
Kropf 1998; Leighley 1990).  Through political discussion, as well as the casual observation of 
others’ behavior (e.g. putting up campaign yard signs), people send and receive messages about  
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the importance of participation, and transmit information about participation opportunities.  
These messages matter, as political activity is highly correlated within discussant networks, even 
after controlling for socioeconomic status and selection effects (Fowler 2005; Kenney 1992).  
Given the tendency toward imitation, exposure to social networks characterized by strong 
participatory norms and frequent political discussion can generate “turnout cascades,” as one 
member’s decision to participate magnifies the incentives to participate for others in the network 
(Fowler 2005; see also Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; McClurg 2003). Huckfeldt (1979) and Giles 
and Dantico (1982), for example, find that  “high-status” adults, who are already inclined to 
participate by virtue of their educational attainment, are even more likely to engage in a variety 
of (socially-based) political acts when they live amongst and interact with other high-status 
adults.
3  Notably, this participation advantage does not accrue to the low-status adults in these 
environments; such individuals, as a consequence of their minority status, are more likely to be 
alienated from rather than integrated into local social networks. In neighborhoods with high 
levels of poverty, where few residents have the individual resources, skills or information 
necessary for effective political action and where, as a consequence, an anti-participation norm 
may prevail within social networks, the tendency toward imitation may offer socially-connected 
residents still more reasons to opt out of politics. 
In short, some neighborhood environments, by virtue of their institutional capacity or the 
civic norms that prevail among local social networks, may encourage political participation more 
than others.  We might reasonably expect, therefore, for a policy intervention such as the MTO, 
because it manipulates participants’ neighborhood environments, to have consequences for 
individual political behavior.  The nature of those consequences, however, is difficult to predict.  
By reducing participants’ exposure to contextual poverty, and permitting access to communities  
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with more institutional resources, the intervention could motivate participants toward greater 
political participation.  In addition to the institutional supports for political engagement, the 
intervention also brings participants into contact with people whose political information, habits 
and connections to mainstream political institutions (e.g. political parties) may reinforce the 
importance of participation.  
But these hypothesized effects depend, in no small part, on participants’ level of social 
integration into their low-poverty communities.  The MTO may be sufficient to bring 
participants into contact with new people, but it is the resulting social relationships that draw 
them into public affairs and political activity.  Certainly, norms are of little consequence when 
people are unaware of the expectations of others; in the absence of social integration, one is 
spared the choice between bearing the costs of political activity or incurring your neighbors’ 
disapproval (Knack 1992). If MTO participants are unable to establish social relationships, or to 
connect to local institutions and organizations, the potential political benefits of living in low-
poverty areas may go unrealized, as Giles and Dantico (1982) observed for “low-status” adults 
living in “high-status” contexts.  Moreover, people whose individual attributes (e.g. welfare 
dependency) mark them as social or political minorities within the community may experience 
ambivalence and social anxiety, negative psychological states that can inhibit participation, even 
where environmental norms encourage political activity (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1995; 
Mutz 2002; see also Knoke 1990). The status dissimilarity between low-income MTO 
participants and the residents of low-poverty neighborhoods, as well as the preference for social 
networks of like-minded people (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001), may create obstacles 
to social integration and relationship formation, with unknown implications for political behavior.  
  8 
Empirical predictions about MTO impacts are complicated further by an experimental 
design that manipulated not only the exposure to contextual poverty, but also the experience of 
residential mobility, a significant life event with its own consequences for political behavior.  
Mobile citizens tend to participate in low numbers, with the likelihood of political activity 
increasing with years at a given address (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Squire, Wolfinger and 
Glass 1987; Highton 2000;  Marschall 2001; Knack 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  In part, 
mobility depresses participation because it imposes administrative costs, such as the need to 
update voter registration, to locate a new polling place and so on.  As Rosenstone and Hansen 
(1993) describe it, people who move “must reestablish themselves politically” (157). The longer 
people live in one place, the more time they have to attend to such political tasks. Mobility also 
imposes social costs. Mobile citizens report fewer social ties to people in their neighborhood, and 
social connectedness is a powerful predictor of civic-minded activity (Berry, Portney and 
Thomson 1991; Knack 1992; Marschall 2001; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Putnam 2000).  Social 
connectedness fosters trust, efficacy and “sense of community” (Marschall and Stolle 2004; 
Berry et al 1991), and also enables the social pressure, recruitment, and information exchange 
that can motivate participation (Knack 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The administrative 
and social costs to moving may be enough to disrupt the habit of voting for the residentially 
mobile.  
The implication is that the MTO intervention, because of its effects on residential 
mobility, may well decrease political participation. MTO participants face the administrative 
burdens that come with “starting over,” burdens that can be particularly cumbersome for adults 
with few resources. The move exacts a social cost as well, by disrupting existing social networks 
and ties. And it takes time to make new friends, even more so in contexts of status dissimilarity  
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(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001).  The central question, then, is whether MTO 
participants are sufficiently socially embedded to realize any positive externalities from living in 
low-poverty neighborhoods? Or, do weak attachments to neighbors and community institutions, 
along with the administrative costs of moving, mean that the benefits go unrealized? In fact, is it 
possible that circumstances conspire to depress political involvement for the MTO participants 
who “won” the voucher lottery? In other words, what has been the net effect of the move to 
opportunity on political participation?   
 
The Moving To Opportunity Experiment 
From 1994-1997, HUD recruited 4248 families from five metropolitan areas—Baltimore, 
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York—to participate in the MTO demonstration 
program.  The families, mostly female-headed minority households, were recruited from among 
the residents of public housing developments located in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of 
at least 40 percent. The families were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group 
(n=1310) whose members remained in their initial public housing development; a “Section 8” 
treatment group (n=1209) whose members received a housing voucher to be used to rent an 
apartment in the private market, under the standard terms of the Section 8 program; and an 
“experimental” treatment group (n=1729) whose members also received a voucher, but one that 
could only be used to lease an apartment in a census tract with a 1990 poverty rate of less than 
ten percent.
4  That is, recipients of an experimental voucher were required to move to a low-
poverty area. To facilitate compliance with the experimental treatment, local non-profits offered 
mobility counseling to the assigned families, helping them locate units, negotiate rents, and 
complete the credit review process.  
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Forty-seven percent of the experimental group families and 61 percent of the Section 8 
families used the housing vouchers to move to a new apartment (i.e. “lease up”). While many 
Section 8 households chose apartments near the center of the city and often in close proximity to 
their original public housing developments, experimental group families were likely to venture 
farther from the city center to locate low-poverty communities with affordable rental housing 
(Orr et al. 2003; Sampson 2008). Figure 1 reports the post-treatment address spells (top panel) 
and census tract poverty levels (bottom panel) for experimental and Section 8 movers and non-
movers, as well as for members of the control group. The address spells measure is a count of the 
number of different addresses, on average, a family has lived at from the year of random 
assignment until 2002, when HUD conducted a comprehensive canvass of the MTO families as 
part of an interim evaluation. The poverty levels depicted in the kernel densities are duration-
weighted averages over all neighborhoods lived from random assignment until 2002.
5  The 
graphs show that 4-7 years after random assignment, adults who received and used the 
experimental and standard Section 8 vouchers were more mobile (i.e. had a larger number of 
address spells) and lived in areas with significantly lower poverty levels than the control group.  
The average number of address spells for experimental movers was 3.3; for Section 8 movers, 
3.4.
6 For the experimental movers, the average 1990 poverty rate in the new census tract was 7.5 
percent; for the Section 8 group movers, 26.9 percent. Meanwhile, the mobility averages and 
poverty densities for non-movers are similar to that for members of the control group.   
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
While the MTO demonstration was not designed to address issues of racial and ethnic 
concentration directly, the racial characteristics of the new neighborhoods differed modestly 
from the original locations and between voucher groups. The experimental movers relocated to  
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tracts that averaged 67 percent non-white; the Section 8 group, 72 percent non-white. The 
original neighborhoods in which the families had lived averaged 91 percent non-white. 
Thus, through random assignment to different voucher groups, the MTO demonstration 
introduced an exogenous source of variation in neighborhood conditions and mobility. 
Specifically, assignment to a voucher group contributed to two dynamics with potential 
implications for political behavior:  (1) members of the experimental and standard Section 8 
group were able to move; and (2) members of the experimental group, in particular, were able to 
move to much better neighborhoods.  
 
Sample and Data Sources 
To assess the political impact of the MTO experiment, I focus on voter registration and 
vote history data collected in 2006, 9-12 years after random assignment, for adult participants.
7 
The sample is restricted to one adult per family; in virtually all cases, the sample adult is the 
female head-of-household at the time of randomization.
 8 At the launch of the MTO 
demonstration, prospective families completed in-person surveys that provide baseline 
information about the sample adults. Table 1 presents selected baseline characteristics, showing 
means for the treatment and control groups. The statistics reveal that the sample adults are 
primarily non-white (almost two-thirds are black); female; low education; unemployed and 
heavily dependent on public assistance. Importantly, the data reported also confirm the success 
of the randomization, as there are no statistically significant differences in the demographic 
composition of each group.  Differences that emerge post-randomization are the consequence of 
the voucher intervention.
9  
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
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Registration and vote data for sample adults come from the official registered voter lists 
maintained by each of the six counties from which the MTO families were originally recruited: 
Baltimore City; Suffolk County, MA; Cook County, IL; Los Angeles County; New York County 
and Bronx County, NY.  While the counties differ in the amount of data they maintain on 
registered voters, in all cases, the available data indicate which county residents were registered 
to vote as of February 2006 and in which (if any) recent elections each registered voter had cast a 
ballot. The vote history data available in all six counties include participation in the elections 
held in November 2002 and November 2004. This analysis restricts its attention to registration 
and turnout in those two elections.   
In collaboration with Abt Associates and HUD, the county voter lists were matched to the 
database of MTO participants based on name, gender, and date of birth.
10  This process identified 
57 percent (n=2428) of the MTO adult sample among the residents registered to vote in the six 
baseline counties.  (Nationally, 61 percent of adults with family incomes of less than $20,000 
were registered to vote in 2004 (Holder 2006).) Another 26 percent (n=1113) of the sample 
adults are not registered to vote, although they still live in one of the six baseline counties. 
Sixteen percent of the participants (n=707) no longer reside in one of the six baseline counties. 
(This figure includes 18 percent of the experimental group, 16 percent of the Section 8 group, 
and 15 percent of the controls.) For these out-migrants, voter registration and turnout are both 
unobserved.
11 While it would be possible to measure differences in registration and turnout 
between treatment and control for just the subgroup of MTO adults who remained in the baseline 
counties, because this subgroup is endogenous to the treatment (i.e. participants who received a 
voucher were more likely to move at all, including moving out of the county), such differences 
would not constitute experimental impacts.    
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To avoid the creation of endogenous subgroups, two sets of registration and vote outcome 
measures are constructed. For the first set of outcome measures, the dichotomous indicators for 
registration status, Registeredb, and turnout, Votedb 2004 and Votedb 2002, are defined such that 
zero identifies any MTO sample adult not registered in a baseline county, including those who 
migrated out of the county. In effect, the outcome of interest is no longer voter registration 
(turnout) in general, but voter registration (turnout) in the baseline county; the result is a 
conservative estimate of political participation. To construct the second set of outcome measures, 
I apply multiple imputation, using Honaker, King, and Blackwell’s (2007) EMB algorithm (and 
accompanying software, Amelia II), to impute values for the unobserved data, i.e. registration 
status and voter turnout among the 16 percent of the sample who are out-migrants.  Multiple 
imputation, which assumes that information in the observed data provides indirect evidence 
about the likely values of the unobserved data (and that, after controlling for the observables, 
missingness is independent of the unobserved data), is known to outperform listwise deletion (i.e. 
removing all out-migrants from the analysis) by correcting for the inefficiency and bias that 
result from the latter approach (Schafer and Olson 1998).  Whether the assumptions that underlie 
multiple imputation are reasonable for the data at hand depends on how well missingness can be 
predicted; for the MTO voter data, missingness can be predicted by factors associated with out-
migration (e.g. owning a car at baseline). With this method, I impute five values for each missing 
cell in the original data matrix, thus generating five “complete” data sets for analysis.
12 In these 
data, the indicators for registration status (Registereda) and turnout (Voteda 2004, Voteda 2002) 
are defined such that zero identifies MTO sample adults who are not registered and/or did not 
vote in any county. The two sets of outcome measures, both of which enable the inclusion of  
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partially observed observations, are evaluated in parallel; as will be seen below, however 
narrowly or broadly the outcome is defined, the estimated treatment impacts are similar.  
 
Models and Empirical Expectations  
To identify the effects of the MTO demonstration on political participation, I compare the 
registration and turnout behavior of adults whose families were offered housing vouchers 
(experimental and Section 8 groups) to those whose families were not offered vouchers (control 
group). There are two estimates of interest that follow from MTO’s experimental design and are 
reported in the tables: the intent-to-treat (ITT) and the treatment-on-treated (TOT) effects. The 
ITT effect, estimated from the difference in mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups 
as a whole, is the effect of being offered the voucher, regardless of subsequent compliance (i.e. 
whether or not the family offered the voucher actually used it to lease up). The TOT effect is the 
effect of the voucher on the compliers—the MTO sample adults who actually leased up using the 
program voucher. Whereas the offer of a voucher was extended to every member of the 
experimental and Section 8 treatment groups, not every group member used their assigned 
voucher. Thus the TOT effects, unlike the ITT effects, are non-experimental, in the sense that 
they are not directly observed for whole randomly assigned groups, but only for the subset of 
compliers within the groups. While the TOT is arguably of greater substantive interest, the ITT, 
though attenuated by non-compliance among some members of the treatment groups, is the only 
direct measure of the effect of the MTO experiment; the experiment was to offer rental vouchers, 
not to mandate their use. Examining the ITT and TOT effects together is essential to a thorough 
assessment of the MTO intervention.    
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In a regression model, we estimate the ITT impact on an outcome with the coefficient on the 
indicator for treatment assignment: 
(1) Yi = α + ZiπITT  + εi 
where Zi indicates assignment status for an individual (indexed by i) and πITT captures the ITT 
effect. We infer the TOT impact from the ITT impact πITT based on the weak assumption that the 
effect of the treatment occurs entirely through moving using a program voucher (i.e. individuals 
in the treatment group were not affected if they were offered a voucher but then did not use it). 
Under this assumption, we know that the treatment impact for the non-compliers (i.e. individuals 
who did not use the voucher) is zero, making the ITT estimate πITT  a weighted average of the 
impact on compliers and the zero effect on non-compliers (Bloom 1984); the weights are the 
portions of the sample that are compliers and non-compliers. As a result, the TOT impact can be 
estimated by dividing πITT  by the program compliance rate for the treatment group (for similar 
approaches to estimating MTO impacts, see Katz, Kling and Liebman 2001; Ludwig et al. 2008; 
Orr et al. 2003).
13  
If the dominant effect of the MTO intervention is to impose on participants the administrative 
and social costs of moving, then we should observe negative ITT (πITT ) impacts, on registration 
and on voting,  for the two groups offered housing vouchers—adults assigned to the 
experimental or to the standard Section 8 groups. Since members of the experimental group 
typically had to move greater distances from their baseline neighborhoods than members of the 
Section 8 group in order to comply with the treatment (i.e. locate an apartment in an eligible low-
poverty neighborhood), the negative ITT impacts may be larger for recipients of the 
experimental vouchers.  If the dominant effect of the MTO intervention is to provide participants 
with access to the institutional resources, role models and recruiting agents available in less poor  
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neighborhoods, then we should observe positive ITT impacts on registration and voting.  The 
positive ITT impacts should be largest for members of the experimental group, who were 
required to move to more affluent areas than members of the Section 8 group in order to comply 
with the treatment.   
The models estimating treatment impacts include as covariates individual factors—
race/ethnicity, gender, age—measured prior to random assignment, as well as fixed effects for 
each of the MTO sites (with New York as the omitted category). The covariates are included in 
order to reduce residual variation, thereby increasing the precision of the impact estimates. 
Finally, all statistical estimates are weighted to adjust for changes in the random assignment 
ratios during the demonstration period, as well as for differences across sites in the random 
assignment ratios (Orr et al. 2003, Appendix B). 
 
Registration, Turnout, and the Move to Opportunity 
The net effect of the changes induced by the MTO demonstration has been to depress 
political participation among voucher recipients in general, and recipients of the experimental 
vouchers in particular. Table 2 reports the results of logit models estimating treatment impacts on 
voter registration and turnout, for the experimental and Section 8 groups combined.
14   To begin, 
consider voter registration. As the first row of the table makes clear, voter registration among 
MTO adult participants is reasonably high. Nearly 60 percent of the control group was registered 
in a baseline county as of 2006; this figure increases to two-thirds once we take into account out-
migrants registered in other counties.  Adults who were offered a housing voucher, with or 
without locational restrictions, are less likely than the adults randomly assigned to the control 
group to be registered to vote in a baseline county. The model estimates a negative intent-to-treat  
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effect of more than three percentage points for the pooled treatment groups. But these effects are 
largely due to the number of out-migrants among the treatment groups. Allowing for the 
possibility that out-migrants may be registered in other counties, we observe no statistically 
significant difference in voter registration relative to the control group. If there are negative 
treatment impacts on voter registration, they are too small to be detected reliably. 
[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Where the negative impact of the MTO demonstration is most evident is on voter turnout, 
also reported in Table 2.  The adults randomly assigned to either voucher group (experimental or 
standard Section 8) were less likely than members of the control group to vote in the 2004 
Presidential election. Whether defined narrowly as voter turnout in the baseline counties, or 
defined so as to allow for out-migrants living and voting outside of the baseline counties, the 
models estimate a negative ITT effect of more than three percentage points for the pooled 
treatment groups. Among the treatment compliers, the effect of receiving and using a housing 
voucher was to lower 2004 voter turnout by 6.8 percentage points, relative to the control group. 
Participation in the 2002 midterm election was uniformly low among all MTO adult participants, 
regardless of random assignment to treatment or control. 
The treatment impacts on voter turnout are especially large for adults assigned to the 
experimental group, whose vouchers could only be used in low-poverty areas. Table 3 reports the 
ITT and TOT effects on voting in the 2004 election for each voucher group.  The model 
estimates a statistically significant negative intent-to-treat effect of 3.9 percentage points and a 
negative treatment-on-treated effect of eight percentage points for the experimental group with 
restricted vouchers. That is, for poor adults who used rental vouchers to move out of public 
housing and into low-poverty neighborhoods (i.e. the compliers), the effect was to lower voter  
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turnout by 19 percent (.082/.428).  Only the treatment impacts for the experimental group 
reached statistical significance, a result that may in part reflect the noise introduced by splitting 
the sample into two treatment groups. The data suggest that the MTO intervention may have had 
some effect on voter turnout among the adults who received the unrestricted Section 8 vouchers 
as well. However, the treatment impact for this group, equivalent to a (statistically insignificant) 
12 percent drop in voter turnout among compliers, is smaller than that observed for the 
experimental voucher group.  In sum, the group whose residential circumstances improved most 
dramatically became the group least likely to be active in electoral politics.  
[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Costs of Mobility: Interpreting Low Turnout among Experimental Voucher Recipients 
 The pattern of negative treatment impacts on voter turnout suggests that the MTO 
intervention succeeded primarily in imposing new costs on participants. Specifically, with 
respect to voter participation, the administrative and social costs of residential mobility may have 
offset any benefits to be realized from exposure to low-poverty contexts. These costs (and, thus, 
the negative treatment impacts) were particularly large for members of the experimental group, 
whose residential moves to areas well away from their baseline communities were likely the 
most disruptive. The result is that the MTO demonstration has had the unintended consequence 
of lowering voter turnout among the “winners” of the housing voucher lottery.  
The design of the MTO demonstration—namely, the use of random assignment via lottery—
provides critical leverage for causal inference. We can now claim that the receipt of an 
experimental voucher, and its use to rent an apartment in a low-poverty neighborhood, caused a 
decline in subsequent voter turnout. But because the intervention simultaneously manipulated  
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multiple correlates of participation—levels of contextual poverty, administrative and social costs 
of mobility—these data can provide only clues to the substantive interpretation of these causal 
impacts, in particular to the relative importance of administrative burdens versus social 
disruptions as drivers of the negative mobility effects.  Among the administrative costs 
associated with residential mobility and responsible for lower voter turnout among frequent 
movers is the need to re-register with each change of address (Highton 2000; Squire, Wolfinger 
and Glass 1987). While residentially mobile citizens have benefited disproportionately from 
electoral reforms such as the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA, aka “Motor Voter”), 
which eased the registration process by permitting citizens to register to vote at public offices 
that they visit for other purposes, mobility remains a statistically significant predictor of 
registration status (Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Knack and White 2000; Wolfinger and 
Hoffman 2001).
15  In the MTO demonstration, not only did compliance with the voucher 
treatment—experimental or standard Section 8—require at least one residential move and, 
therefore, the need to re-register at least once, but many of the voucher compliers undertook 
additional moves. (Recall Figure 1 reporting the number of address spells, on average, for MTO 
participants between the year of random assignment and the 2002 interim evaluation. Compliers 
averaged more than three address spells post-assignment.) For a variety of reasons, from landlord 
conflicts to the need for larger apartments, nearly two-thirds of the experimental compliers—and 
a similar proportion of the Section 8 compliers—made one or more additional moves after their 
initial lease up, a level of ongoing mobility that HUD had not anticipated when designing the 
demonstration (Orr et al. 2003).  Many of these repeat movers changed neighborhoods as well as 
apartments (Briggs and Turner 2006; Kingsley and Pettit 2008; Comey, Briggs and Weismann 
2008).  Yet, we observe no treatment impacts on voter registration, for either members of the  
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experimental or the standard Section 8 groups. Voucher recipients are no less likely to be 
registered to vote than are members of the control group, despite the greater effort required. The 
implication is that the administrative burden of having to re-register to vote is likely not the 
cause of the negative treatment impacts.
  
The administrative costs of mobility also include the task of locating a new polling place. 
Brady and McNulty (2004) estimate that a polling-place change is sufficient to lower voter 
turnout by nearly 2 percentage points, with most of this effect due to increased “informational 
and search costs” (see also McNulty, Dowling and Ariotti 2009).  For members of the 
experimental group, who ventured farther from the familiar territory of their baseline 
neighborhoods than did the members of the section 8 group, this logistical burden may be 
particularly difficult. Moreover, the ongoing mobility of many voucher recipients—not simply 
the initial move out of public housing, but the pattern of repeated moves to new apartments and 
new neighborhoods—would lead to frequent changes in polling locations. These disruptions may 
be contributing to the 19 percent drop in voter turnout among the experimental compliers.  
However, if the costs associated with finding a new polling place were the sole factor in 
explaining the negative treatment impacts, then we might reasonably expect the adults who 
experienced the most residential instability post-assignment—and, thus, the most frequent 
polling-place changes—to exhibit the lowest rates of voter turnout. Figure 2 presents a lowess 
curve of voter turnout by residential stability (measured by the number of address spells since 
randomization) for experimental compliers. The graph reveals that, contrary to expectation, even 
the adults with relatively more stable residential circumstances, e.g. the experimental compliers 
who moved only once or twice and then stayed put, voted at rates as low as their more peripatetic 
counterparts.  This pattern is notable when one considers that Wolfinger and Rosentone (1980)  
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found negative mobility effects to diminish sharply after only two years at a given residence, as 
the administrative costs of mobility recede (see also Highton 2000, Highton and Wolfinger 1998). 
But as late as November 2004, 7-10 years after the MTO experiment, and despite being 
registered to vote, low turnout rates persist among even the most residentially stable 
experimental compliers. The persistence of low turnout suggests that the logistics of locating a 
new polling place, and the administrative costs of moving more generally, cannot account fully 
for the negative treatment impacts of the MTO intervention.
16  
[PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Mobility not only imposes administrative costs, it is also socially disruptive.  The social 
disruptions associated with the MTO demonstration may explain the low voter turnout among 
the experimental compliers, including the more residentially stable members of this group. 
Because it takes a lot more time to make new friends than it does to find a new polling place, the 
social costs of mobility accrue for years. The costs may be particularly high for recipients of the 
experimental vouchers, whose socio-economic attributes (and, to a lesser extent, racial 
characteristics) do not align with those that are dominant in their low-poverty neighborhoods, 
and who moved to areas less physically proximate to their baseline communities. Status 
dissimilarity makes relationship formation more difficult (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 
2001), and distance complicates efforts to maintain existing social relationships.   
A 2002 interim evaluation survey of the MTO families (Orr et al. 2003), as well as evidence 
emerging from in-depth interviews and ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2004 and 2005 as 
part of the Three-City Study of MTO (Comey, Briggs and Weismann 2008; Briggs and Tanner 
2006; Popkin 2008), hint at the social disruptions experienced by members of the experimental 
group.  Even 6-10 years after their initial relocation, Briggs and Tanner (2006) find movers who  
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remain “quite isolated” from social ties and support systems, and who have failed to “convert 
new locations into social capital” (Popkin 2008).  As they describe it, “new neighborhoods, at 
least for a significant period of time, are residential locations rather than important social worlds” 
(Briggs and Tanner 2006, 50), with few MTO movers participating in community institutions.  
In the 2002 survey, respondents were asked a short battery of questions about their social 
networks, including the frequency with which they visit with friends and attend church.  (Of the 
4248 sample adults, 3526 were interviewed by HUD for the interim survey.) Members of the 
experimental group were significantly less likely than adults assigned to the control group, or to 
the Section 8 voucher group, to report having visited with friends “during the past thirty days”  
(Figure 3, top panel). In addition, these adults were less likely to report attending church at least 
once a month in the previous year (Figure 3, bottom panel). While the impact on church 
attendance is significant at only the p<.10 level, a Wald test confirms that the predicted 
probabilities for the experimental and standard Section 8 groups are significantly different from 
one another at p<.02.   
[PLACE FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The available survey evidence is limited, but the patterns are consistent with the ethnographic 
accounts of the social disruptions associated with MTO-related mobility.  Long after relocation, 
adults whose families moved to low-poverty areas continued to pay the social costs of mobility, 
measured in less time with friends and at church.  These lost social ties have been cited, 
particularly by critics of MTO and other housing mobility programs (Venkatesh and Celimli 
2004; Venkatesh et al. 2004; Curley 2009; Clampet-Lundquist 2004; Garshick Kleit 2010), as 
undermining the ability of the poor to cope with material hardships, adjust to their new 
neighborhoods, and take advantage of their new opportunities. MTO policymakers, while still  
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optimistic about the promise of the program, also suspect that the social disruptions may be to 
blame for the null effects of the intervention on indicators of social and economic well-being 
such as employment and earnings (Briggs and Turner 2006; Ludwig et al. 2008). The disruptions 
may also be undercutting political activity. The effect of mobility on church attendance is 
particularly noteworthy in this regard, as it suggests less access to the networks of recruitment 
and mobilization embedded within such institutions (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Harris 
1999). 
 
Discussion 
The spatial concentration of poverty is a phenomenon associated with a wide array of 
negative outcomes, from chronic joblessness to delinquency and depression. Poor families 
confined to deeply poor neighborhoods suffer structural disadvantages that exacerbate the 
hardships of individual poverty and limit the opportunities for social mobility. The Moving to 
Opportunity Demonstration Program experimented with a new approach to combating poverty: 
the random allocation of Section 8 rental vouchers to families living in public housing, with 
some vouchers restricted to use only in low-poverty neighborhoods. The ambition of federal 
policymakers was to improve the social and economic well-being of the recruited families, using 
the tool of residential mobility. And, in fact, the effects of the MTO demonstration on 
dimensions such as mental health and educational achievement have been amply documented 
(Orr et al. 2003; Kling, Liebman, Katz 2007; Kling, Ludwig, Katz 2005; Leventhal and Brooks-
Gunn 2003; Ludwig, Duncan, Hirschfield 2001; Katz, Kling, Liebman 2001). The MTO 
intervention, however, has had unintended consequences for the political lives of the participants 
as well.  Until now, those effects were unknown.  
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Analysis of the vote history of MTO adult participants, 7-10 years after the voucher lottery, 
reveals that adults whose families received Section 8 vouchers were less likely to vote in 
November 2004, although no less likely to be registered. The negative effect of the MTO 
intervention was most visible for the participants whose vouchers could only be used in low-
poverty areas. For the compliers among this group, the experiment reduced voter turnout by eight 
percentage points, or 19 percent, when compared to voter turnout among the lottery “losers,” 
who did not receive rental vouchers.   
The pattern of negative treatment impacts suggests that, with respect to vote participation, the 
mobility enabled by the MTO intervention imposed costs substantial enough to offset any 
benefits to be realized from improvements in participants’ residential circumstances.  The nature 
of these costs cannot be determined with certainty from the data available. As Sampson, 
Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley (2002) explain, “the random assignment of housing vouchers 
does not address causal processes of why” (467; italics in original). But there is reason to believe 
the negative impact is due less to the short-term administrative burdens that accompany mobility, 
such as the need to locate a new polling place, than to the longer-term social disruptions.  
Consistent with the social costs of mobility, the MTO participants who received low-poverty 
vouchers report less frequent church attendance and less social interaction with friends and 
family.  Moreover, voter participation is depressed among low-poverty voucher recipients 
regardless of how long they have lived in their new neighborhoods. As low-income newcomers 
to low-poverty areas, settling in neighborhoods well away from their baseline communities, 
adults who used the experimental vouchers may have experienced social disruptions profound 
and persistent enough to lower voter turnout, even among the more residentially stable members 
of the group.   
  25 
The MTO demonstration was designed to combat poverty, not to test academic theories of 
political participation. Nonetheless, the intervention has implications for such theories. The 
absence of participatory gains among adults offered experimental vouchers should remind 
scholars to be cautious when making strong claims about the existence, direction or magnitude of 
neighborhood effects on political behavior, particularly among the poor (Cohen and Dawson 
1993; Alex-Assensoh 1998).  Where scholars have previously documented, on the basis of 
observational data alone, concentrated poverty to be negatively associated with participation, 
such results may be the spurious consequence of endogenous neighborhood selection. Poor 
people who live in high-poverty neighborhoods may be different in politically relevant ways 
from poor people who seek out and settle in low-poverty neighborhoods.  Past research 
potentially has confused the effects of neighborhoods with the effects of the (unobserved) 
characteristics of individuals who live in different types of neighborhoods. What MTO suggests 
is that neighborhood effects on participation may be non-existent—or, more likely, conditional 
on a level of social integration into community life that is not easily achieved by poor residents 
of low-poverty neighborhoods.
17  By comparison, the evidence is more favorable to theoretical 
accounts of residential mobility, especially those that emphasize the social disruptions that result 
from moving. When considering the political behavior of the poor, scholars should bear in mind 
that the social costs of mobility may exceed the benefits of neighborhoods.  
The finding that the MTO demonstration has lowered voter turnout for the adults who 
received, and used, housing vouchers restricted to low-poverty neighborhoods presents a 
dilemma for policy practice.  On the one hand, a federal program that leads to less political 
activity among the poor may seem of little consequence, if these effects are the unintended result 
of efforts to combat the underlying causes of poverty (Berry, Portney and Thomson 1991). It is  
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no small victory that MTO has improved neighborhood conditions, adult mental health, and 
educational outcomes for girls (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). On the other hand, there are few 
groups with more at stake in public policy than the urban poor. In that respect, political activism, 
including voting, must be viewed as part of the solution to the problems of the poor. As Callahan 
(1998) observed, “in a country where tens of millions of low-income people don’t vote, 
politicians face few penalties when they cut poverty programs and redistribute income upward” 
(see also Plutzer and Wiefek 2006).  The tension that is evident in the MTO demonstration—
between the goal of improved social and economic well-being and the value of political 
engagement—is a problem to be examined and solved, and not simply a nuisance to lament but 
dismiss.  
A policy solution will first require a fuller grasp of the nature of the problem. Future 
study of the MTO demonstration, and similar mobility interventions, should document the range 
of political effects. Are the negative treatment impacts limited to voting turnout, or do they 
extend to other modes of political participation?  Is it only the adults who are voting less, or does 
the negative treatment impact span generations? How have the children of MTO, particularly 
those who are now of voting age, fared?  And when, if ever, do the negative impacts attenuate? 
Finally, we must bring more evidence to bear regarding the causal mechanisms. To be sure, the 
preferred policy remedy would still enable greater residential mobility for the poor. But if the 
administrative and/or social costs of moving are particularly burdensome for the poor—and the 
optimistic assumptions about the ease with which low-income movers establish social ties in 
low-income neighborhoods have proven to be unrealistic—then future mobility interventions 
should include more comprehensive post-move support, focused on helping families to acclimate 
to their new communities and to develop social and institutional connections (Briggs and Tanner  
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2006; Popkin 2007, 2008).  Without that, the cumulative effect of these increasingly popular 
interventions may be to further weaken poor Americans’ already fragile ties to the political 
system.  
Notes 
 
1 For example, poor people who seek out and settle in low-poverty neighborhoods may possess a 
degree of motivation or cultural capital and skills that (1) sets them apart from the equally poor 
residents of high-poverty neighborhoods and (2) promotes political engagement. 
2 A notable exception would be the churches and other religious institutions that are present even 
in areas of concentrated poverty (Alex-Assensoh 1998; Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; 
McRoberts 2004).  Religious institutions can be instrumental in facilitating political mobilization, 
as Harris (1999) and others have demonstrated. 
3  Each of these studies distinguishes between socially-based (e.g. campaigning, attending rally) 
and individually-based (e.g. voting, contacting) participation, and conditions the effect of 
neighborhood context on individual socio-economic status. Neither study finds evidence of a 
relationship between neighborhood composition and individually-based participation, regardless 
of individual socio-economic status. However, Huckfeldt (1979) finds that living in high-status 
neighborhoods mobilizes high-status individuals to greater socially-based political participation, 
while demobilizing low-status adults. In contrast, Giles and Dantico (1982), while finding 
similar mobilizing effects among high-status adults, find neighborhood composition to have no 
effect on socially-based political participation among those of low socio-economic status. 
4 The locational restrictions on the experimental group applied only for the first year following 
random assignment. Treatment group families who failed to lease up were able to remain in 
public housing. 
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5 The available census tract data are categorical: <10%; 10-19%; 20-29%; 30-39%; 40% or more. 
The data provided to the author by HUD do not include the precise poverty rate in each census 
tract lived from random assignment through December 31, 2001.  
6 The minimum number of address spells post-randomization for an experimental or Section 8 
mover is two: (1) the spell at the baseline (i.e. pre-move) address, plus (2) the spell at the address 
to which the family moves using the program voucher.  
7 Voter registration data for the MTO participants were not collected at baseline; as such, it is not 
possible to calculate a pre-post estimate of the treatment effect.  
8 There are 29 sample adults without baseline data on race/ethnicity. They were excluded from 
analysis.  
9 Appendix Table A1 reports the post-randomization demographic characteristics of the 
experimental and Section 8 movers and non-movers.  
10 The match to the county voter files was conducted by Abt Associates, a HUD contractor, using 
confidential MTO data  (e.g. name, date of birth) to which the author was not permitted access.  
The matched data made available to the author do not include any identifying information.  
11 To be clear, registration and turnout are observed for 84 percent of the sample, the adults still 
living in one of the six baseline counties. The remaining 16 percent of the sample, for which 
registration and turnout are unobserved, are scattered across more than 90 different counties, 
making it prohibitively expensive to assemble the additional county voter lists needed to 
determine the registration and turnout status of these participants.  Additionally, the author does 
not have access to the confidential MTO data (name, gender, date of birth) required to match the 
voter files to the MTO database. 
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12 Across the five imputed datasets, the observed values are the same, but the missing values are 
filled in with different imputations. Each complete data set is analyzed using standard complete-
data statistical methods. The results presented in the tables are the combined results across 
imputed datasets, calculated using formulas that incorporate missing-data uncertainty (see King 
et al. 2001, 53 for formulas).  
13 The standard errors for the TOT estimates are similarly adjusted. Thus, while TOT impact 
estimates are substantially larger than ITT estimates (because they are not attenuated by zero 
effects of the intervention on the non-compliers), they are statistically significant only if the ITT 
estimate is significant.  
14 For ease of interpretation, Tables 2 and 3 report first differences (and 95% confidence 
intervals), calculated using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001), with baseline covariates 
held constant at mean values. The logit coefficient tables are available upon request.  
15 In the post-Motor Voter era, mobile citizens remain less likely to be registered, but they are 
more likely than the residentially stable to take advantage of the NVRA provisions—namely, 
completing their registration at a drivers’ license registration center or a public assistance agency 
(Wolfinger and Hoffman 2001). Wolfinger and Hoffman (2001) report that, in the year after 
NVRA took effect, nearly 40 percent of recently-moved new registrants had registered at motor 
vehicle or public assistance offices, compared with only a quarter of more settled new 
registrants. 
16 It is also significant that the subset of adults who ultimately complied with the experimental 
treatment had been more likely, at baseline, to have a high-school diploma (39.7%), to own a car 
(19.4%), and to have a smaller family size (3.5).  (See Appendix Table A1.) In other words, the 
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people who moved were the people relatively more able to shoulder the administrative costs of 
moving. Yet, despite these advantages, we observe negative treatment impacts.  This is further 
evidence that administrative costs alone cannot account for the lower turnout. 
17 An unanswered question is whether the lack of social integration is a temporary consequence 
of the MTO participants’ newcomer status, or a permanent condition. If it proves to be a 
permanent condition, and voter turnout remains depressed, then this would suggest that it is not 
simply the social costs of mobility that lowers participation among the experimental compliers, 
but also perhaps the social experience of being poor in a well-off community (see Huckfeldt 
1979; Giles and Dantico 1982).  These questions can only be answered with continued tracking 
of the MTO participants.  
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Table 1: Select Demographic Characteristics of MTO Participant Families, at Baseline 
 
      Control Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Section 8 
Group 
Site Sample Size                   
   Baltimore  197  252  187 
   Boston  326  366  267 
   Chicago  232  460  202 
   Los Angeles  260  250  168 
   New York  295  401  385 
                       
Head of Household                   
   Female  97.9%  98.6%  97.8% 
                       
   Hispanic  30.0%  30.2%  30.9% 
   Black Non-Hispanic  63.6%  62.8%  62.0% 
   White Non-Hispanic  2.5%  3.1%  2.6% 
                       
   Never Married  63.6%  62.1%  61.9% 
                       
   Average Age  33.3  33.5  33.7 
                       
  
High School 
Graduate  35.6%  39.7%  37.3% 
   GED  20.3%  17.2%  18.9% 
                       
   Working for pay  25%  27.2%  25% 
                       
Average Family Size  3.7  3.7  3.8 
                       
Percent of Households with 
AFDC/TANF Income  74.6%  74.5%  75.3% 
                       
Percent of Households with a 
Car  15.2%  17.4%  16.8% 
                       
Percent of Households 
Previously Applied to Section 8  43.8%  42.0%  39.0% 
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Table 2: Treatment Effects on Registration and Turnout, in Baseline County and Any 
County, for Pooled Experimental and Section 8 Treatment Group 
 
        
Participation in 
Baseline County    
Participation in Any 
County 
         (Out-Migrants=0)    
(Out-Migrants 
Imputed) 
 
Outcome Measure                   
Registered                   
   Control Mean     0.599     0.673 
                       
   Pooled ITT     -.034 [-.066, -.002]*     -.028 [-.060, .005] 
   Pooled TOT     -.064 [-.124, -.004]*     -.053 [-.113, .009] 
                       
Voted 2004                   
   Control Mean     0.383     0.428 
                       
   Pooled ITT     -.038 [-.073, -.003]*     -.036 [-.071, -.001]* 
   Pooled TOT     -.071 [-.137, -.006]*     -.068 [-.133, -.002]* 
                       
Voted 2002                   
   Control Mean     0.199     0.233 
                       
   Pooled ITT     -.031 [-.057, -.006]*     -.027 [-.059, .004] 
   Pooled TOT     -.058 [-.107, -.011]*     -.051 [-.111, .008] 
   Total N        4219    
   Pooled Lease Rate        0.533    
 
Note: Results from analysis with Section 8 and experimental groups pooled into single treatment 
group. Control means and treatment effects are regression-adjusted, using logit models. 
Treatment effects (and 95% confidence intervals) on probability of registration and turnout are 
estimated with site indicators and baseline covariates (race, age, gender) held constant at mean 
values. Cell entries in column two ("Participation in Any County") are the combined results 
across five multiple imputation datasets (King et al. 2001, 53). *p<.05 
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Table 3: Treatment Effects on Registration and Turnout, in Baseline County and Any 
County, for Each Treatment Group 
 
        
Participation in 
Baseline County    
Participation in Any 
County 
         (Out-Migrants=0)    
(Out-Migrants 
Imputed) 
 
Outcome Measure                   
Registered                   
   Control Mean     0.599     0.673 
                       
   Experimental Group ITT     -.032 [-.073, .009]     -.020 [-.060, .017] 
   Experimental Group TOT     -.068 [-.154, .019]     -.042 [-.127, .036] 
                       
   Section 8 Group ITT     -.037 [-.081, .007]     -.039 [-.082, .003] 
   Section 8 Group TOT     -.060 [-.131, .011]     -.063 [-.133, .005]  
Voted 2004                   
   Control Mean     0.383     0.428 
                       
   Experimental Group ITT     -.041 [-.079, -.003]*     -.039 [-.078, -.001]* 
   Experimental Group TOT     -.086 [-.167, -.006]*     -.082 [-.165, -.002]* 
                       
   Section 8 Group ITT     -.032 [-.072, .007]     -.033 [-.078, .001] 
   Section 8 Group TOT     -.052 [-.117, .011]     -.053 [-.126, .002] 
Voted 2002                   
   Control Mean     0.199     0.233 
                       
   Experimental Group ITT     -.037 [-.066, -.008]*     -.031 [-.063, .004] 
   Experimental Group TOT     -.078 [-.139, -.017]*     -.065 [-.133, .008] 
                       
   Section 8 Group ITT     -.022 [-.052, .009]     -.021 [-.056, .014] 
   Section 8 Group TOT     -.036 [-.084, .015]     -.034 [ -.091, .023] 
   Total N     4219 
   Experimental Lease Rate     0.474 
   Section 8 Lease Rate     0.617 
 
Note: Control means and treatment effects are regression-adjusted, using logit models. Treatment 
effects (and 95% confidence intervals) on probability of registration and turnout are estimated 
with site indicators and baseline covariates (race, age, gender) held constant at mean values. Cell 
entries in column two ("Participation in Any County") are the combined results across five 
multiple imputation datasets (King et al. 2001, 53). *p<.05 
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Appendix Table A1: Select Demographic Characteristics (at Baseline) of MTO Voucher 
Movers and Non-Movers 
 
     
Control 
Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Section 8  
Group 
        
Non-
Movers 
Voucher 
Movers 
Non-
Movers 
Voucher 
Movers 
                    
Head of Household                
Hispanic  30.0%  41.10%  28.70%  48.2%  27.0% 
Black Non-Hispanic  63.6%  50.4%  62.9%  40.4%  67.2% 
White Non-Hispanic  2.5%  3.4%  4.0%  5.1%  1.9% 
                    
Age  33.3  36.8  31.8  38.2  32.1 
                    
HS Graduate  35.6%  35.5%  39.7%  30.2%  39.3% 
GED  20.3%  18.1%  19.4%  18.0%  18.9% 
                    
Percent Working for Pay   25%  27%  27%  23%  26% 
                    
Average Family Size  3.7  3.8  3.5  3.7  3.7 
                    
Percent Households with 
AFDC/TANF Income  74.6%  67.2%  77.5%  71.1%  78.6% 
                    
Percent Households with a Car  15.2%  13.7%  19.4%  13.1%  18.4% 
                    
Percent Households Previously 
Applied to Section 8  43.8%  38.6%  44.6%  33.9%  40.0% 
 
Note: Columns 2-4 report the baseline characteristics of MTO voucher recipients who ultimately 
did or did not move using the assigned voucher.  
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Figure 1: Post-Treatment Residential Mobility and Neighborhood Poverty, By Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data from MTO Interim Impact Evaluation, 2002 (Orr et al. 2003).  An address spell is the 
period of time a family resides at one address. Each change of residence initiates a new address 
spell. The top panel plots the average number of address spells from the year of random 
assignment until 12/31/2001. Average poverty level (bottom panel) is a duration-weighted 
average of all census tract locations lived from randomization until 12/31/2001. 
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Figure 2: Lowess Curves of 2004 Turnout by Residential Mobility, for Experimental 
Movers Only 
 
 
 
N
o
Y
e
s
V
o
t
e
d
 
2
0
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Number of Address Spells
Dataset 1
Dataset 2
Dataset 3
Dataset 4
Dataset 5
Observed Vote
 
For each dataset, unobserved 'Vote 2004' is imputed for out-migrants;
observed 'Vote 2004' is unchanged across datasets. 
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Figure 3: Post-Treatment Social Ties and Church Attendance, By Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data from MTO Interim Impact Evaluation Survey, 2002 (Orr et al. 2003).  "Frequency 
Socialize" is a scale, with values ranging from 0-12, created by summing responses to two 
survey items: (1) During the past 30 days, about how often did you have friends or relatives over 
for dinner? (2) During the past 30 days, about how often have you visited with friends or 
relatives at their homes? "Church Attendance" is a binary variable, where 1 indicates attendance 
at least once per month. Expected values (and 95% confidence intervals) are estimated using 
OLS ("Frequency Socialize") and logit ("Church Attendance") models, with site indicators and 
baseline covariates (race, age, gender) held constant at mean values. 
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